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O'Neil: Circumventing the Exclusionary Rule
NOTES

CIRCUMVENTING THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE
The fourth amendment, and the nearly identical declaration contained in the Florida Constitution, 2 guarantee a citizen's immunity
from unreasonable search and seizure by governmental authorities.
The purpose of these mandates is to interpose the judiciary between
law enforcement officials and private citizens. Searches and seizures are
considered reasonable in several instances, notably when police officers
obtain search warrants. 3 Experience has shown, however, that overzealous policemen have not always scrupulously adhered to the procedures they are required to follow. The problem of how best to
deter these officers and at the same time ensure the apprehension
and conviction of criminals is of major import to all of us.
In an early attempt to reconcile these competing interests, the
United States Supreme Court devised the federal exclusionary rule.4
The rule allows an accused person, whose privacy has been invaded
by government officials, to exclude evidence illegally acquired from
admittance at the trial. The Court, apparently feeling that the rule
has been of some success, has recently extended it to the states through
the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. 5
When applied, the exclusionary rule removes the incentive for an
illegal search. A prosecutor may possess improperly seized evidence
believed sufficient to convict an accused, but the rule will prevent
its introduction and consideration by the jury. Since the fruits of the
illegal search are thereby rendered valueless, it is reasonable to expect
that law enforcement officials will be more carefully schooled regarding what constitutes a reasonable search.
1. U.S. CONsT. amend. IV: "The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures,

shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched,
and the persons or things to be seized."

2. FLA. CoNsT. Decl. of Rights §22: "The right of the people to be secure
in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable seizures and
searches, shall not be violated and no warrants issued, but upon probable cause,
supported by oath or affirmation, particularly describing the place or places to
be searched and the person or persons, and thing or things to be seized."
3. This note will not discuss the several circumstances in which search
without warrant is deemed reasonable.
4. See Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1913).
5. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). This decision overruled Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 33 (1949), wherein the Court held "that in a prosecution in a
State court for a State crime the Fourteenth Amendment does not forbid the
admission of evidence obtained by an unreasonable search and seizure." For further
historical development, see Eichner, The "Silver Platter"-No Longer Used for
Serving Evidence in Federal Courts, 13 U. FLA. L. Rlv. 311 (1960).
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The Court has resorted to this indirect method of deterrence because civil and criminal remedies of the private citizen against an
offending officer have proven ineffectual to safeguard the constitutional
rights being infringed. 6 In New York City, for example, no civil
actions against law enforcement officers for illegal search and seizure
were filed during the whole of a decade: In Florida, statutes provide
criminal penalties for two aspects of illegal search," yet these statutes
have not been enforced. The Court has apparently come to the reasonable conclusion that prosecutors will not indict persons who, in
violating the fourth amendment, are gathering evidence upon which
the prosecutors rely for their convictions. Thus, by removing any
chance of a prosecutor gaining a conviction by relying on this evidence, the Court has developed a workable method of discouraging
unreasonable searches. As the New Jersey Supreme Court recently
stated: 9
"The exclusionary rule rests upon two propositions. The first
is that the government should not stoop to the 'dirty business'
of a criminal in order to catch him. The second is that the
civil and criminal remedies against the offending officer are as
a practical matter ineffective, and hence the rule of exclusion
is the only available remedy to protect society from the excesses
which led to the constitutional right."
The exclusionary rule, nevertheless, has its drawbacks. In many
instances it may allow the guilty to go free. No doubt remains however, that the Court considers non-interference with the citizen's right
to privacy to be of paramount concern. Furthermore, in most cases
the guilty need not go free when trained officers observe reasonable
methods in obtaining evidence of guilt.
STANDING TO SUPPREss EvIDENCE

In practice the exclusionary rule has proved to be a less than complete deterrent to unreasonable search. Evidence illegally seized may
still, in many instances, be used to convict. The police still have an
incentive for gathering evidence in violation of the fourth amendment. This is so because of the courts refusal to allow all persons
accused of crime to object to its admissibility. To make use of the
rule, a defendant must question the validity of the search. The courts
will not allow him to do so unless he has the requisite standing to
6. See Mapp v. Ohio, supra note 5; People v. Cahan, 44 Cal. 2d 434, 282 P.2d
905 (1955); 4 JoNEs, EVIDENCE §873 (5th ed. 1958).
7. 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §2184 (b) n.46 (rev. ed. 1961).
8. FLA. STAT. §§933.16-.17 (1961).
9. Eleuteri v. Richman, 26 N.J. 506, 512, 141 A.2d 46, 60 (1958).
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move for the suppression of the evidence. 10 Who has standing? This
question and the effects of the procedural requirement will be discussed
below.
The federal rules of criminal procedure allow a "person aggrieved"
by an unlawful search and seizure to move for the return of the
property seized and for the suppression of the evidence." Florida, consistently following federal rules and case law in the field of search
and seizure, permits a similar procedure.12 Prior to 1960, the federal
courts held that an accused, to be a "person aggrieved" within the
meaning of the federal rules, must have some interest in the searched
premises or in the property seized. 1 It has always been clear that
the owner of the premises searched or the goods taken had the necessary quantum of interest since it is his right to privacy that the fourth
14
amendment was designed to protect.
Allegations of a degree of interest less than complete ownership
led to a mixed variety of federal court decisions based upon highly
technical property law concepts. Standing was denied to guests, 5
invitees,'6 and employees who lacked possession 7 of the goods seized.
However, a person who had dominion 8 over the premises or who was
a lessee or licensee 9 could attack the introduction of the unlawfully
seized evidence. The Florida courts had limited the right to suppress
evidence illegally seized to those persons who had right or title 20 in
10. See notes 15-20 infra.
11. FED. R. CRIMf. P. 41(e): "A person aggrieved by an unlawful search and
seizure may move the district court for the district in which the property was
seized for the return of the property and to suppress for the use as evidence of
anything so obtained on the grounds that (1) the property was illegally seized
without warrant, or (2) the warrant is insufficient on its face, or (3) the property
seized is not that described in the warrant, or (4) there was not probable cause
for believing the existence of the grounds on which the warrant was issued, or (5)
the warrant was illegally executed. The judge shall receive evidence on any issue
of fact necessary to the decision of the motion. If the motion is granted the property shall be restored unless otherwise subject to lawful detention and it shall not
be admissible in evidence in any hearing or trial. The motion to suppress evidence
may also be made in the district where the trial is to be had. The motion shall
be made before trial or hearing unless opportunity therefor did not exist or the
defendant was not aware of the grounds for the motion, but the court in its discretion may entertain the motion at the trial or hearing."
12. See Mixon v. State, 54 So. 2d 190 (Fla. 1951).
13. Jeffers v. United States, 187 F.2d 498 (D.C. Cir. 1950), affd 342 U.S. 48

(1951).
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.

See Jones v. State, 262 F.2d 234 (D.C. Cir. 1958), rev'd 362 U.S. 257 (1960).
Gaskins v. United States, 218 F.2d 47 (D.C. Cir. 1955).
Jones v. State, supra note 14.
Connolly v. Medalie, 58 F.2d 629 (2d Cir. 1932).
McMillan v. United States, 26 F.2d 58 (8th Cir. 1928).
United States v. De Bousi, 32 F.2d 902 (D. Mass. 1929).
Church v. State, 151 Fla. 24, 9 So. 2d 164 (1942).
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the building searched, or who owned or controlled2- the property
seized. The immunity given by the fourth amendment and the Florida Declaration of Rights was consistently held to be personal, validly
claimed only by the individual whose rights were invaded.2 2 "One
must claim and prove himself to be the owner, lessee or tenant, or the
lawful occupant of the premises searched in order to be protected
against an unreasonable search of the premises and seizure of prop-

erty on

it."23

The Jones Decision
In 1960, in Jones v. United States,24 the United States Supreme
Court eased the standing requirement by eliminating the necessity of
alleging a particular property interest in the premises searched or
the goods seized. In so doing, the Court increased the protective
ambit of the exclusionary rule as a guard against illegal police activities. The Jones case dealt with a person who was labeled an "invitee"
or "guest" by the lower federal court.25 Narcotics had been found by
investigators in an apartment while they were conducting an illegal
search. The accused had slept in the apartment "maybe a night"
but was not the lessee. He was charged with violation of the Narcotics Drugs Import and Export Act2 6 and non-compliance with the
Internal Revenue Code.2 7 Mr. Justice Frankfurter, delivering the
opinion of the Court, discarded the common-law property concepts
previously used by the federal courts in determining standing. He
ruled that an accused "legitimately on premises where a search
occurs" 2 8 may challenge the introduction of evidence seized during
the search. The accused must be the "one against whom the search
was directed, as distinguished from one who claims prejudice only
through the use of evidence gathered as a consequence of a search
and seizure directed at someone else."
As a second ground for the holding in the case, the Court said
that no longer could the federal government take advantage of the
dilemma of an accused person charged with possession of contraband.
Prior to Jones the accused had to admit possession in order to suppress the evidence of it. By claiming ownership or possession he
21.
22.
23.
24.

Chacon v. State, 102 So. 2d 578 (Fla. 1957).
Tribue v. State, 106 So. 2d 630 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1958).
Id. at 633.
362 U.S. 257 (1960).

25. Jones v. State, supra note 14.
26.

35 Stat. 614 (1914), 21 U.S.C. §174 (1958) (unlawful to facilitate the con-

cealment and sale of narcotics illegally imported into the United States).
27. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §4704 (a) (unlawful to buy, sell, dispense, or distribute narcotics without appropriate stamps).
28. 362 U.S. 257, 267 (1960).
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achieved the required standing but this admission might be used
against him. Anyone now charged with possession of contraband, or
indicted for an offense wherein possession is alleged and is the
basis for the desired conviction, has a right, in the federal courts, to
challenge the validity of the search without asserting an incriminating
possessory interest in the illicit property.
It is not clear whether Jones held that standing will be conferred
upon a defendant in the federal courts if possession of contraband is
just one of the elements of the offense or if it is just evidence of guilt.2 9
Subsequent federal decisions have allowed standing to persons legitimately on the premises where the search occurred; 30 but one case
strictly limited the right of a person found in possession of illegal
articles to attack the validity of the search, stating that unless
the accused was charged with illegal possession he should not be
allowed to suppress the evidence. 31
Leveson v. State
Florida has recently ruled on a standing problem similar to the
problem raised in Jones. As presented in Leveson v. State32 the issue
was whether an accused had standing to challenge the legality of a
search of a "girl friend's" apartment. Defendant Leveson paid the
rent for the apartment and passed several nights there. He was
charged with operating a gambling room, aiding in setting up, promoting or conducting a lottery, bookmaking, and possession of lottery
tickets. He was convicted of all but the first charge. The proof of
his guilt was the evidence that had been seized. On appeal to the
third district, the conviction was reversed and remanded. The court
limited its discussion to whether the defendant was "legitimately on
the premises." Defendant had failed to raise the possession of contraband issue in the lower court so this aspect of standing was not discussed. Judge Hendry felt that Florida should expressly adopt the
Jones rationale giving Leveson standing to suppress because legitimately on the premises with the permission of the tenant-"girl friend."
Judge Carroll concurred in allowing the defendant standing but construed his position as being that of a lessee-occupant and thus well
within earlier Florida holdings permitting a lessee to challenge a
29. See Annot., 4 L. Ed. 2d 1999 (1960).
30. See Monnette v. United States, 299 F.2d 847 (5th Cir. 1962); United States
v. Paroutian, 299 F.2d 486 (2d Cir. 1962); Henzel v. United States, 296 F.2d 650
(5th Cir. 1961); Contreras v. United States, 291 F.2d 63 (9th Cir. 1961); Hair v.
United States, 289 F.2d 894 (D.C. Cir. 1961); Bourg v. United States, 286 F.2d 124
(5th Cir. 1960); Foster v. United States, 281 F.2d 310 (8th Cir. 1960).
31. Ramirez v. United States, 294 F.2d 277 (9th Cir. 1961).
32. 138 So. 2d 361 (5d D.C.A. Fla. 1962).
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search of the premises. 33 Judge Carroll thought it unnecessary to commit Florida to the Jones position. Chief Judge Pearson, in a strong
dissent, proclaimed Florida's freedom from the confines of the fourth
amendment and from the United States Supreme Court's rulings on
who is a "person aggrieved" by an illegal search and seizure.
Whether Florida can disregard the Jones holding is not clear,"
but the Florida Supreme Court has consistently followed the lead of
the United States Supreme Court when fourth amendment freedoms
are in issue.35 Courts in our sister states that have ruled on suppression of evidence problems since Jones, have, with but one exception,36
diligently followed its lead, but without expressly deciding the con3
stitutional question of their obligation to do so. 7

THE INTERPLAY OF THE FOURTH AND FIFTH AMENDMENTS

Of the two grounds for the ruling set down in Jones, by far the
more important from the standpoint of law enforcement is that dealing with possession of contraband. Indictments for illegal possession
of various kinds of contraband arise frequently in Florida. A charge
of illegal possession normally fails without the support of the evidence
found within the control of the defendant.
Before the influence of the Jones decision, prosecutors were in a
powerful position. A charge of illegal possession based on evidence
garnered through an unreasonable search could be filed with assurance
that the evidence either would be admitted, despite the exclusionary
rule, or if excluded, the accused would be forced to admit the very
charge upon which the indictment rested; for to gain standing the
defendant had to allege a proprietary interest in the premises where
the goods were found or in the contraband itself. Failure to allege
the required interest was to be confronted with the introduction of
the evidence at the trial. The defendant's so-called choice rested upon
his "right" to waive the fourth amendment immunity from illegal
search and seizure by denying ownership or possession, thus failing
to allege sufficient interest to gain standing to challenge the introduction of the evidence, or to waive the no less important immunity from
33. Tribue v. State, supra note 22.
34. See Annot., 78 A.L.R.2d 246, 251 (1961).
35. See Collins v. State, 65 So. 2d 61 (Fla. 1953); Atz v. Andrews, 84 Fla. 43, 94
So. 329 (1922); Leveson v. State, 138 So. 2d 361 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1962); Houston v.
State, 113 So. 2d 582 (1st D.C.A. Fla. 1959).
36. Stevenson v. State, 334 S.W.2d 814 (Tex. App. 1960).

37. See People v. Kelley, 23 Ill. 2d 201, 177 N.E.2d 830 (1961); People v. Jackson, 22 111. 2d 375, 176 N.E.2d 803 (1961)

(dictum); People v. Cocchiara, 221

N.Y.S.2d 856 (Gen. Sess. 1961) (recommending abolition of the standing requirement); State v. Pokini, 367 P.2d 499 (Hawaii 1961); People v. Mayo, 19 Ill. 2d 131,
166 N.E.2d 440 (1960).
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self-incrimination guaranteed by the fifth amendment, by admitting
possession or ownership and gaining the opportunity to challenge the
search. Such a "choice" obviously amounted to no choice at all.38
CONCLUSION

Florida has not yet adopted the position of the United States Supreme Court as reflected in Jones. The lack of majority agreement
as to the basis for allowing standing in the Leveson case makes it
difficult to forecast Florida's eventual rule. Presently, Florida courts
still allow prosecutors to place a person accused of possession of contraband into an insolvable dilemma. Florida courts still base the interest necessary for an accused to challenge the validity of a search
and seizure upon common law property concepts, which, in the words
of Mr. Justice Frankfurter "more than almost any other branch of
law, has been shaped by distinctions whose validity is largely historical.,,30
The present limitation on who may challenge an unlawful search
and seizure undermines the effectiveness of the exclusionary rule as
a deterrent to unauthorized search by the police. If fourth amendment
rights are considered more important than the quest for truth in
our criminal trials, which is the only conclusion to be drawn from
the extension of the federal exclusionary rule to the states, 40 these
same rights should not be defeated by procedural niceties.
The accused's right to object to the use of evidence gained by an
unlawful search of his home rests upon the premise that the government should not be allowed to profit from its own wrongs. Yet the
government is allowed to profit from its own wrongs if the illegal
search is not directed at the accused and the person at whom the
search is directed is not indicted for a criminal offense. An illegal
search of this nature is successful from the policeman's point of view
despite the exclusionary rule. The rule is circumvented since the accused has no standing under present federal or Florida law.
Since the Jones decision, the standing requirement invites federal
prosecutors to indict persons for offenses other than possession of contraband even though possession is the basis for the arrest. Florida
prosecutors can be expected to follow suit should Jones become law
in Florida. By carefully wording their informations or indictments,
38. See Edwards, Standing to Suppress Unreasonably Seized Evidence, 47 Nw.
U.L REv. 471 (1952); see also, Davis v. United States, 328 U.S. 582 (1945); Boyd v.
United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886), on the interplay of the fourth and fifth
amendments in the context of search and seizure.
39. Jones v. United States, supra note 24, at 266.
40. Mapp v. Ohio, supra note 5.
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the prosecutors can circumvent the exclusionary rule by negating an
accused's standing to challenge the validity of the search and seizure.
When an illegal search divulges information that can be used
against several persons, the requirement of standing to suppress evidence illegally seized invites prosecutors in federal and Florida courts
to dismiss charges against the one person who may have standing in
order to use the evidence against the others, who do not have the
necessary quantum of interest required to gain standing. 41 Here again,
the police still have an incentive to perpetrate unreasonable searches.
Due to the loopholes illustrated by examples such as these the
exclusionary rule, because of the requirement of standing to suppress
evidence illegally seized, is not completely fulfilling its promise of
deterrence.
In the opinion of this writer Florida should go beyond the traditional bases of standing even as broadened by the Jones decision.
One state, California, has already taken affirmative action to prevent
further erosion of fundamental constitutional rights as a result of
limited standing to suppress. In that state anyone against whom the
evidence is sought to be introduced can complain of the methods used
in obtaining it.42 California's position indirectly forces lawful methods

of search upon its officials; for they gain nothing by their trespasses.
It is argued that abolition of the standing requirement would
directly benefit the criminals in our society. For example, persons
found in possession of contraband, in almost all instances, are guilty
as charged. The evidence excluded would prove their guilt. But
there is an alternative to allowing these persons to go free. Instead
of illegal searches to acquire evidence of criminal activities, the police
can gain the same information by using reasonable methods. Moreover, evidence obtained by a reasonable search and seizure is evidence that will be admitted at the trial of an accused. It is evidence
that the jury will be able to consider. When the question of circumventing the exclusionary rule next arises in a legislative or a
judicial context, Florida will be well advised to heed the warning
43
of Mr. Justice Frankfurter:
"It is easy to make light of insistence on scrupulous regard for
the safeguards of civil liberties when invoked on behalf of the
unworthy. It is too easy. History bears testimony that by such
disregard are the rights of liberty extinguished, heedlessly at
first, then stealthily, and brazenly in the end."
LAWRENCE J.

41.
42.
43.
Justice

O'NEIL

But cf. McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451 (1948).
People v. Martin, 45 Cal. 2d 755, 290 P.2d 855 (1955).
Davis v. United States, supra note 38 at 597 (dissenting opinion of Mr.
Frankfurter).
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